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ABSTRACT
How does monetary policy impact upon macroprudential regulation? 
This paper models monetary policy’s transmission to bank risk 
taking, and its interaction with a regulator’s optimization problem. 
The regulator uses its macroprudential tool, a leverage ratio, to 
maintain  financial stability, while taking account of the impact 
on credit provision. A change in the monetary policy rate tilts 
the regulator’s entire trade-off. We show that the regulator allows 
interest rate changes to partly “pass through” to bank soundness by 
not neutralizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Thus, 
monetary policy affects financial stability, even in the presence of 
macroprudential regulation
Will macroprudential policy 
counteract monetary 
policy’s effects on 
financial stability? 
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Abstract
How does monetary policy impact upon macroprudential regulation? This paper
models monetary policys transmission to bank risk taking, and its interaction with a
regulators optimization problem. The regulator uses its macroprudential tool, a leverage
ratio, to maintain nancial stability, while taking account of the impact on credit provi-
sion. A change in the monetary policy rate tilts the regulators entire trade-o¤. We show
that the regulator allows interest rate changes to partly "pass through" to bank sound-
ness by not neutralizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Thus, monetary
policy a¤ects nancial stability, even in the presence of macroprudential regulation
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1 Introduction
The nancial crisis has reignited the debate on whether monetary policy should target nancial
stability. Those who favor a policy of leaning against the buildup of nancial imbalances (Borio
and White, 2004; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Disyatat, 2010; Schularick and Taylor,
2012; Stein, 2014) nd their argument strengthened by a growing body of empirical research,
which shows that the policy rate signicantly a¤ects bank risk taking.1 But the opponents
contend that this does not necessarily justify an altered mandate for the monetary authority:
why cannot the bank regulator alone take care of bank risk (Svensson, 2014)?
Would a macroprudential authority indeed take care of the nancial stability side e¤ects
of monetary policy? This paper confronts two issues towards answering this question. First it
models the e¤ects of monetary policy on banksbehavior and identies two channels, termed
the prot and leverage channels. Second, it asks whether the regulator can neutralize these
e¤ects. Modeling the trade-o¤ faced by a macroprudential regulator explicitly, we show that
an optimizing regulator will not neutralize the impact that monetary policy has on nancial
stability. This, in itself, does not justify an altered mandate for monetary policy. But it
does nuance the argument that macroprudential policy is a precision tool to address any
externalities from monetary policy to the nancial sector.
In our model a bank chooses both the riskiness of its asset prole, as well as how much
to lever up its liability side. Risky bank portfolios and leveraged balance sheets often go
together, as they did in the run-up to the global nancial crisis. When banks have higher
leverage, they have less at stake, because their own equity is then a smaller fraction of the
total balance sheet. And risky assets make the possibility of externalizing losses to society
through higher leverage more attractive, if bank debts are covered by explicit or implicit
1This is found by Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibanez (2010, 2014), Delis and Brissimis (2010),
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011, 2013), Delis and Kouretas (2011), Delis, Hasan and Mylonidis (2011), Paligorova
and Santos (2012), Gerl et al. (2015), DellAriccia, Laeven and Suarez (2017), Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto
(2014a,b), Jiménez et al. (2014), Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2015) and Morais, Peydró and Ruiz (2015).
Monetary policy may also induce risk taking in the non-bank sector (Feroli et al., 2014; Hanson and Stein,
2015; Chen et al., 2015; Galí and Gambetti, 2015; Cecchetti, Mancini-Gri¤oli, and Narita, 2017). See also the
discussions in Bayoumi et al. (2014), Smets (2014) and IMF (2015).
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government guarantees. Hence, from the banks perspective, asset side riskiness and liability
side indebtedness are complementary.
In this setup we show that the monetary policy rate a¤ects the banks risk decisions through
two channels, prot and leverage, with countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, a higher rate
pushes up the banks funding costs. This reduces its protability and the bank then has less
to lose from a risky strategy: when a deposit-insured bank has less own "skin-in-the-game"
it is more inclined to consider the upside of risk only. This is the prot channel of monetary
transmission to bank risk. On the other hand, a higher policy rate makes leverage more
expensive to the bank, which as a result would then opt for less debt funding.2 This means
that the bank internalizes more of its risk taking and reduces the riskiness on its asset side.
We call this the leverage channel of monetary transmission to bank risk.
The cumulative e¤ect of monetary policy on bank risk taking will depend on which of the
two channels dominates. If it is the leverage channel that dominates, then the transmission
conrms the results of the empirical literature: lower policy rates translate into higher risk.
A macroprudential regulator is introduced in the model, whose tool is a cap on the leverage
ratio, as has recently been implemented within the regulatory framework of Basel III. The
regulator moves after monetary policy has been set (exogenously) and before the bank takes
its decisions. His aim is nancial stability and capping leverage retains more of the banks
capital bu¤er and also generates incentives for the bank to take less asset risk, thus reducing its
probability of default. However, there are also costs associated with nancial disintermediation
as a result of limiting leverage, and the regulator takes these into account. His preferences are
concave up, which means that sacricing additional credit supply against improved nancial
stability becomes more costly the more the regulator tightens his standards. We show that
his trade-o¤ can be represented by a standard possibilities frontier and indi¤erence curve.
We show that the interest rate a¤ects the regulators entire possibilities frontier. Both
credit supply and bank soundness are a¤ected by monetary policy, and therefore the entire
2The economic signicance of this e¤ect is conrmed in the empirical work on monetary policy and leverage
of Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010), Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010), Bruno and Shin (2015), and Angeloni,
Faia and Lo Duca (2015).
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environment in which the regulator operates responds to monetary conditions. As we show
using our model, it would take a knife-edge parameterization for the regulator to maintain the
same level of nancial stability in the face of any interest rate change. Normally the regulator
would allow part of the transmission from monetary policy to bank risk to "pass through"
and would not use his tool to counteracts its e¤ects in full.
The direction in which monetary policy a¤ects macroprudential policy is not trivial, how-
ever. Under one set of conditions, which arguably relate to the upward phase of a nancial
cycle, the leverage e¤ect dominates. Then, an interest rate cut worsens nancial stability. The
regulator optimally tightens in response, but not to the point where nancial stability returns
to what it was before the rate cut.
Instead, under conditions that resemble a post-crisis environment the prot e¤ect domi-
nates, and a rate cut improves nancial stability. Here too, the regulator does not neutralize,
but rather moves along with monetary policy by partly easing his policy (which in practice
could take the form of post-crisis regulatory forbearance, for example). It is only under one
very specic - knife-edge - condition that regulatory policy maintains nancial stability at the
same level for any interest rate, i.e., full neutralizationof the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature
and how our contribution ts in it. Section 3 presents the banks problem and the assumptions
that we make in order to derive analytical solutions. Section 4 then describes how monetary
policy a¤ects the banks behavior and thus identies two channels. Section 5 describes the
regulators problem and how monetary policy a¤ects his operating space and therefore utility.
Finally section 6 summarizes the results and discusses policy implications.
2 Related literature
The existing literature on the relation between monetary policy and the nancial sector uses
two types of models: DSGE macro models and bank-based models. In di¤erent ways both
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of these literatures have had much to say about the transmission of interest rates to the
nancial sector and about the implications for monetary policy. In some cases prudential
tools are introduced and their merit as an alternative to leaning against the wind is considered.
In comparison, our paper contributes by explicitly modelling the optimization problem of a
regulator and how this is a¤ected by monetary policy via a banking sector that has both
endogenous asset risk and leverage.
In the DSGE macro literature many papers build on the framework of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) by incorporating nancial frictions. Reviews of this literature can be
found in Gertler and Kyotaki (2010) and Loisel (2014). However, for the most part, banks are
a passive friction in these models.3 There are exceptions to this, such as Goodhart, Osorio and
Tsomocos (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Angeloni and Faia (2013), He and Krishnamurty
(2013) and Laseen, Pescatori and Turunen (2017) who construct macro models with banks
that decide upon riskiness. However, all risk taking occurs on the liability side of banks.
Instead, in Cociuba, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2016) banks choose between risky and safe
investments, while leverage is given.4
In the macro models of Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014), De Paoli and Paustian (2017),
and Collard et al. (2017) there is a macroprudential regulator, in addition to the monetary
authority.5 These papers investigate welfare under (non-)cooperation between the authorities.
Our focus is instead on providing an analytical argument for why leaning against nancial
imbalances could make sense.
In Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) the macroprudential authority has a single task,
namely maintaining nancial stability. In the absence of coordination, it tightens its regula-
tory standards too much in response to an adverse nancial shock, imposing negative exter-
3Nonetheless, even absent bank risk choice there can be interaction between monetary policy and bank
regulation: bank capitalization a¤ects loan rates, and thus interacts with monetary transmission. See, for
instance, De Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah (2010), Darracq Pariès, Kok Sørensen and Rodriguez-Palenzuela
(2011), Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012), and Agénor, Alper and Pereira da Silva (2013). Financial wealth
can provide an alternative route to generate macronancial linkages (Vitek, 2017).
4Alternative approaches include non-linear modelling (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Ajello et al., 2016)
and general equilibrium models that are not dynamic and stochastic (Goodhart et al., 2013; Cesa-Bianchi and
Rebucci, 2017).
5See also Bodenstein, Geurrieri and LaBriola (2016), Van der Ghote (2017) and Carrillo et al. (2017).
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nalities on the monetary authority through reduced output growth. De Paoli and Paustians
(2017) model mechanisms are similar, but they derive the authorities objectives from mi-
crofoundations and use these to analyze the e¤ects of cooperation, discretion and rst-mover
assignments on the policy outcomes.
Collard et al.s (2017) model provides a benchmark case in which the separation of mon-
etary and prudential policies is optimal. In their model, the prudential regulator targets the
excessive risk incentives that arise from bankslimited liability. Capital requirements a¤ect
output, but because bank risk is pure waste (and discrete-choice) in their baseline model, the
externality to monetary policy is positive. Extending to an ad hoc negative externality, they
nd that nonetheless separation achieves rst-best for plausible parameterizations.
The bank-based models (to which our paper belongs) highlight various types of channels
through which monetary policy a¤ects the nancial sector: through the incentives of banks
to monitor (DellAriccia, Laeven and Marquez, 2014); the screening of borrowers by banks
(DellAriccia and Marquez, 2006); the skewness of bank returns (Valencia, 2014); the impact
on information asymmetries (Loisel, Pommeret and Portier, 2012; Drees, Eckwert and Várdy,
2013; Dubecq, Mojon and Ragot, 2015); the incentives of bank loan o¢ cers or asset managers
whose incentives deviate from prot maximization (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Morris and
Shin, 2016); the impact on nominal contracts between banks and creditors that cannot be
made state-contingent (Allen, Carletti and Gale, 2014); and moral hazard when policy rates
are used as a bailout mechanism (Diamond and Rajan, 2012; Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
Related to our paper is also Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2011), who model the interaction
between the monetary policy rate and optimal prudential regulation, although their focus is
on liquidity regulation, whereas ours is on bank capital regulation (through a leverage ratio).
They show that the policy rate a¤ects both the pre-crisis incentives of banks to hold cash
reserves and the risk of bank runs during a crisis. Moreover, liquidity regulation cannot
perfectly substitute for the policy rates impact, implying that conducting monetary and
prudential policies separately is sub-optimal. Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2011) and our paper
are complements in this respect, highlighting a similar point from the perspectives of liquidity
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and capital regulation, respectively.6
3 The banks problem
We begin by describing the banks problem. The banks entire balance sheet consists of debt
d and internal capital c. Owners and managers of the bank are one and management thus
strives purely to maximize the residual claims for the capital owners. Here c can arise from
either retaining past earnings or inside equity of bank owners. Internal equity holders accrue
the banks residual returns. The issuance of additional external equity is assumed to be
prohibitively costly. This type of structure, a reduced form departure from the Modigliani-
Miller world with irrelevant capital structure, is used elsewhere in the banking literature
(Thakor, 1996). In addition to d and c, we dene the following variables:
x : banks chosen risk prole
r : bank funding rate
R(x) : gross rate of return on the banks risky project
p(x; d) : probability of bank survival (non-default), which depends on the banks
risk prole (x) and its leverage (d):
The banks expected prot is then as follows:
E [] = p (x; d) [R (x) (d+ c)  rd] ; (1)
which is the probability of bank survival times the net return conditional on survival. Both
x and d are dened in a closed interval, x 2 [0; X] and d 2 [0; D], (necessary to ensure
consistency with a probability p(x; d) 2 [0; 1]). We assume the following features hold:
1. p (x; 0) = 1, since without debt there is nothing to default on.
6If we accept that monetary policy should include a nancial stability objective along its traditional ob-
jectives of ination and output stabilization, then we can show that the timing of optimal monetary policy
changes, as we do in the companion paper Agur and Demertzis (2013). In response to a negative demand
shock, rate cuts become both deeper and shorter-lived, as the monetary authority aims to mitigate the buildup
of bank risk caused by protracted low rates.
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2. p (0; d) = 1, since absent risk taking the bank always survives. That is, the x = 0 prole
is dened to be the risk-free prole.
3. p (X; d) = 0 and p (x;D) = 0. We thus normalize maximum risk to certain default.
4. p0x < 0, p
00
x < 0, p
0
d < 0, p
00
d < 0: the probability of default rises exponentially in the
risk and leverage taken by the bank. Also a minimal amount of risk is very unlikely to
lead to default but as risky behavior increases, the likelihood of default rises faster and
therefore the probability of survival declines concavely.
5. R0 (x) > 0 andR00 (x) < 0. Contingent upon not defaulting, the bank earnsR (x) (d+ c) 
rd. Increased risk taking lowers the probability of the banks survival but, if the bank
does survive then it earns a higher return. While the rate of return R rises in risk, the
marginal gain from additional risk taking is declining. In other words, the bank has to
push risk to increasingly large levels in order to generate ever higher returns. Note that
the partial equilibrium nature of the model is implicit in the fact that the return on a
risky project, R (x), does not depend on the state of the economy (including r).
6. p ("1; "2) [R ("1) ("2 + c)  r"2] > 0 for "1 ! 0+; "2 ! 0+. A marginal amount of asset
risk and leverage yields a higher expected return than no risk or debt (a su¢ cient but
not necessary condition for this could be to impose that p0x ! 0 for x! 0, and p0d ! 0
for d! 0). In conjunction with p (X; d) = 0 and p (x;D) = 0 (see point 3) this implies
interior solutions. We restrict attention to interior solutions only as it is there that risk
taking and leverage respond to monetary and prudential policies.
7. By implication, x 2 (0; X) and d 2 (0; D), where x and d are optimal asset risk
prole and leverage respectively.
8. r = R (0), that is, r is the same as the risk-free (x = 0) rate of return. The banks
funding rate, r. The monetary policy rate - such as the Federal funds rate in the US
or the repo rate in the euro area - a¤ects the cost of short-term wholesale bank funding
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directly. In the context of the model, we identify the policy rate with the risk-free rate
r and will in the next section use it to perform comparative statics. The fact that banks
pay no risk premium on their funding costs implies the that there is a deposit-insurance
in place, assumed to be exogenous to the model (i.e. funded by the government not the
bank itself).
Problem 1 The bank chooses a risk prole and level of debt to maximize its expected prots,
i.e.:
max
x;d
fE []g = max
x;d
fp (x; d) [R (x) (d+ c)  rd]g : (2)
4 Monetary transmission
In the context of our model the so-called risk-taking channel of monetary transmission (Borio
and Zhu, 2012) is formalized as the impact of r on bank risk choice, x. Monetary policy rate
changes are considered here exogenous events, like in the other bank-based models discussed
in section II. While clearly a simplication, we can think of the divergence of real and nancial
cycles as a justication for their exogenous nature, from the perspective of the nancial sector.
That is, monetary policy might target ination and the output gap, which diverge from the
leverage and credit cycle generated by the nancial sector (Borio and Shim, 2007). There are
then policy rate "shocks" to the nancial sector that originate in monetary policys response
to the business cycle.
Remark 2 The policy rate a¤ects bank risk taking incentives in two ways: directly through
prots, and indirectly through debt:
dx
dr
=
@x
@r
+
@x
@d
@d
@r
: (3)
Then,
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Proposition 1 We identify these e¤ects as the two transmission channels:
Channel 1 -"Prot e¤ect", @x

@r
> 0: for given leverage, a higher r increases x
Channel 2 -"Leverage e¤ect", @x

@d
@d
@r
< 0: a higher r lowers d, and consequently also x
Proof. The proof comes in two parts.
Part 1: Prot E¤ect
We rst take the FOC of expected prots in (2) w.r.t. x.
p0x (x; d) [R (x) (d+ c)  rd] + p (x; d)R0 (x) (d+ c) = 0;
or,
rd
d+ c
= R (x) +
p (x; d)
p0x (x; d)
R0 (x) ;
which, given that p0x < 0 can be more intuitively written as:
rd
d+ c
= R (x) R0 (x) p (x; d)jp0x (x; d)j
: (4)
We can use (4) to infer the relation between r and x as it holds for all x, including x. The
right-hand side (RHS) of (4) increases unambiguously in x, i.e. @RHS
@x
> 0. This is because:
1. R (x) increases in x (as R0 (x) > 0);
2. R0 (x) declines in x (as R00 (x) < 0);
3. p (x; d) declines in x (since p0x < 0);
4. jp0x (x; d)j increases in x (since p00x < 0).
Re-write (4) as rd
d+c
= RHS: it follows that whatever increases term rd
d+c
must also increase
optimal risk taking x. This implies that:
 @x
@c
< 0: an increase in bank capital reduces a banks risk taking incentives.
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 @x
@d
> 0: and increase in debt increases risk taking.7
 @x
@r
> 0: the policy rate a¤ects bank risk taking directly: prot e¤ect.
Part 2: Leverage E¤ect
We have already shown that @x

@d
> 0 above. It remains to show that @d

@r
< 0. We can
obtain this derivative from the FOC w.r.t. d:
p0d (x; d) [R (x) (d+ c)  rd] + p (x; d) [R (x)  r] = 0:
Solving for d we get:
d =
p (x; d)
jp0d (x; d)j
  cR (x)
R (x)  r : (5)
It follows from (5) that @d

@r
< 0, and it turn that @x

@d
@d
@r
< 0: the leverage e¤ect.
4.1 A discussion of the risk-taking channel
Our result shows that a higher policy rate has two countervailing e¤ects on bank risk. On
the one hand, it lowers bank protability because the rate the bank has to pay on its funding
increases with the risk free rate. With lower protability the bank has less at stake and is
more inclined to take risk. On the other hand, the increase in the policy rate raises the cost
of debt and induces the bank to lever less. Leverage on the liability side and risk on the asset
side are complementary, from the banks perspective. With less leverage the bank sees fewer
benets to high risk projects, and thus lowers its optimal risk taking. If the "leverage e¤ect"
dominates the "prot e¤ect" then a rate hike lowers bank risk taking and vice versa, consistent
with the results of the empirical literature discussed in the introduction.
As concerns the "prot e¤ect", note that we have considered a setup where there is no
direct impact of the monetary policy rate on the banks asset side. That is, the policy rate
can inuence the banks choice of project (i.e., its risk prole), but the policy rate does not
7Strictly speaking, we also need to invoke property 4 from the list in Section III. That is: p0d < 0, p
00
d < 0.
This ensures that p(x;d)jp0x(x;d)j in (4) rises in d and therefore the RHS of (4) falls in d, absent an increase in x.
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a¤ect the returns of the projects. In reality there is of course a transmission from monetary
policy to a banks assets as well as its liabilities. The transmission to bank assets is less direct,
however, as asset returns are usually a¤ected by long rates, while the bank nances itself
against short rates. The monetary policy rate directly determines short nancing rates while
it has a much smaller impact on long rates (a statement that is valid mainly for conventional
monetary policy, however, since quantitative easing does a¤ect long rates directly).
5 Regulation
A macroprudential regulator faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, he cares about nancial
stability, but on the other he does not wish to constrain unnecessarily nancial intermediation
and credit provision to the economy. Irrespective of his formal mandate, no regulator would
want to implement excessively stringent requirements in reality, for a number of reasons. First,
limiting leverage imposes a direct constraint on credit provision to the economy. In the context
of our model, the bank provides (d+ c) worth of credit and thus the link between leverage
and credit provision is linear. Admittedly, in reality there are several margins through which
the impact on credit supply may be softened: banks may be able to issue some additional
equity, or their borrowers may nd alternative sources of funding, like bond or equity issuance.
Nevertheless, both of these tend to provide only limited potential relief, since particularly small
and medium sized enterprises often have few alternatives to bank-based funding, while banks
usually have to pay signicant discounts for additional equity issuance (Miller, 1995).
Second, bank debt is special in many ways. This is clearest for the case of demandable
deposits, which provide payment services as well as maturity transformation benets to retail
depositors. Wholesale depositors are similarly interested in the maturity transformation ser-
vices of banks. Thus, regulators undoubtedly do see costs to restraining bank leverage, and
this is why they never actually opt for demanding primarily equity nanced banks.
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5.1 The regulators problem
In the context of our model the nancial stability objective is captured by p (x; d), the prob-
ability of bank survival. The regulator maximizes the following utility function:

 (p (x; d) ; d) ;
where 

0
p() > 0 and 

0
d > 0. That is, the regulator cares about sustaining nancial stability
through p (x; d), but at the same time puts a weight on retaining enough credit supply, and
therefore allow the bank to raise funds, d. Here one can immediately sense the regulators
trade-o¤ since:
d

d (d)
=
@

@p (x; d)
@p (x; d)
@d
+
@

@d
;
where the rst term is negative (since @p(x;d)
@d
< 0) and the second is positive. Bank leverage
has countervailing e¤ects on the regulators aims because leverage raises bank risk but also
increases bank credit provision.
We provide the regulator with a simple tool, a leverage cap d, with which it can control
the banks debt prole. This tool is akin to the leverage ratio in Basel III, and had been part
of Basel I in the past. It was temporarily discarded during the Basel II era, but the degree
of leverage buildup by nancial intermediaries before the recent nancial crisis convinced
regulators to re-introduce the tool. This is the simplest tool to apply within our framework,
and allows for clear-cut analytical results.
It is in the nature of a leverage ratio that its e¤ects are broad-based, since credit supply
is directly linked to the size of bank balance sheets, which in turn depend upon the price
and availability of ample bank funding. We note that if instead the regulator would have
access to some tool, which could directly target bank risk taking, x, without any other side
e¤ects, then the problem we investigate would not arise. There would be no trade-o¤ to
the regulator and he would simply maintain minimum risk according to his tool. We would
argue, however, that most realistic macroprudential tools do have macroeconomic implications.
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Similar to a leverage ratio, for instance, systemic capital surcharges a¤ect bank funding costs,
and may therefore impact credit supply. LTV ratios are another common macroprudential
tool, which can improve the resilience of the property sector to adverse shocks, but also have
macroeconomic consequences: households may need to consume less and save more in order
to a¤ord the larger down payments on a house. Thus, while we consider one specic type
of macroprudential tool, we believe that the type of trade-o¤ we allude to is more generally
applicable.
Problem 3 Given bank maximization of expected prots in (2), the regulatorchooses a lever-
age cap, d, to maximize utility, i.e.:
max
d

 (p (x; d) ; d) : (6)
That is, the regulator acts rst, determining the leverage cap, after which the bank solves
its optimization problem. Through backward induction the regulator knows how his tool will
a¤ect the banks choice variables: namely, the extent to which d will constrain the banks
preferred d, and how this will a¤ect x and in turn the e¤ect on p (x; d).
The regulator faces concave up indi¤erence curves and concave down possibilities frontiers
in the [d; p (x; d)] space.
Concave up indi¤erence curves: This is the result of standard concavity assumptions:
i.e. 

00
p() < 0 and 

00
d < 0. Intuitively, this means that the marginal benet of additional bank
soundness is positive but declining (improving nancial stability is more important when
default risk is high than when it is low) and similarly the benet of additional credit provision
is positive but declining (more credit is particularly valuable when rms and households are
credit constrained, but less so when there is already ample credit going around).
Concave down possibilities frontiers: Here the convexity of the possibilities frontier
comes from previous assumptions: we recall that p0d < 0 and p
00
d < 0.
The regulators optimization problem can be visually represented in gure 1. The point
where the regulators indi¤erence curve is tangential to the possibilities frontier identies the
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regulators optimum. Figure 1 draws the interesting case where the regulatory constraint
binds, i.e. d < d; and therefore the regulator forces the bank to hold less leverage than the
bank would have chosen absent of regulation. This, in turn, raises the probability of bank
survival from p (x; d) to p
 
x; d

, consistent with the regulatory motive of helping banks to
survive.
Figure 1: regulators optimization
d
p(x,d)
Possibilities frontier
Indifference curve
0
d
( )dxp ,
*d
( )**,dxp
1
Next we turn to the impact of an interest rate change, which as far as the regulator is
conserned is exogenous. We can think of an exogenous monetary authority moving rst, setting
its interest rate according to its own objectives. Subsequently, the macroprudential regulator
comes in and decides how to best respond given the interest rate environment. And nally the
bank determines its asset risk prole and leverage given the interest rate and macroprudential
policy. Note that here we are giving the regulator the maximum extent of "exibility" to
cope with bank risk taking. In reality, the macroprudential policy is infrequently adjusted
in most countries, contrary to monetary policy which can move at a higher frequency. This
would mean that the macroprudential regulator has less ability to counteract the impact of
monetary policy on nancial stability.
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5.2 Interest rate impact on bank risk taking
Our focus is on how the regulators operating space is a¤ected by interest rate changes and
how he responds as a result. Any interest rate change is going to a¤ect the possibilities frontier
and therefore the regulators ability to achieve rst best. To demonstrate that we derive rst
the slope of the possibilities frontier: p0d =
dp(x;d)
d(d)
. In derived form this is:
dp (x; d)
d (d)
=
@p (x; d)
@x
@x
@d
+
@p (x; d)
@d
:
We can then examine how this slope changes with r and therefore also monetary policy:
@
@r

dp (x; d)
d (d)

=
@p (x; d)
@x
( )
@x
@d
(+)
24@d
@r
( )
+
@x
@r
(+)
35+ @p (x; d)
@d
( )
@d
@r
( )
; (7)
where term

@d
@r
+ @x
@r

is the result from applying the power rule to di¤erentiate

@p(x;d)
@x
  
@x
@d

with respect to r. Overall, the derivative @
@r

p
0
d

is of ambiguous sign, but only because
@d
@r
+ @x
@r

is also of ambiguous sign. The term @d
@r
represents the impact of the interest rate on
bank leverage, which is part of the leverage e¤ect (equation 3), and @x
@r
is the direct impact of
the interest rate on bank risk, the prot e¤ect. We consider three separate cases.
Case 1
@d
@r
  @x
@r
: the e¤ect of monetary policy on debt dominates the e¤ect on the banks
ability to generate prots. In this case, we unambiguously have that @
@r

p
0
d

> 0 in equation
(7). This means that the slope of p
0
d rises (becomes less negative) with r. By symmetry, a
rate cut will translate into an inward pivot of the possibilities frontier, as depicted in gure 2.
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Figure 2: impact of a rate cut when the prot e¤ect is relatively weak
d
p(x,d)
0
1
d'd
( )dxp ,
( )',dxp
For any inward pivot of the possibilities frontier, and with concave up indi¤erence curves,
it must be true that the new optimum moves "inward" too. That is to say, the rate cut
causes a decrease of both the regulators leverage cap d and a decline in the banks survival
probability, p (x; d). In other words, a rate cut puts upward pressure on bank risk, and the
regulator counteracts this by tightening macroprudential policy. However, given the trade-o¤s
he faces, he does not go so far as to keep nancial stability the same. That is, he allows part
of the e¤ect of monetary policy on bank risk to "pass through" to nancial stability, and bank
soundness is unambiguously lower after the rate cut than before it, in spite of the regulators
tightening. The entire trade-o¤ of a macroprudential regulator is a¤ected by the policy rate,
and since he is unwilling to truly "neutralize" its impact, monetary policy imposes a negative
externality. The situation depicted in gure 2 depends on the relative strength of the leverage
e¤ect. As suggested by most of the cited empirical studies (see footnotes 1 and 2), this e¤ect
may have dominated in the run-up to the global nancial crisis. If so, a low interest rate
environment worsens the trade-o¤ the regulator faces.
Case 2
@d
@r
 < @x
@r
: following a monetary policy change, the e¤ect on the banks ability
to generate prots dominates that on debt. Note that the overall impact of an interest rate
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change remains ambiguous in (from equation 7):
@p (x; d)
@x
( )
@x
@d
(+)

@d
@r
+
@x
@r

(+)
+
@p (x; d)
@d
( )
@d
@r
( )
:
If @x
@r
is only slightly larger than
@d
@r
 then the situation depicted in gure 2 continues to
hold. If instead @x
@r
is large enough relative to
@d
@r
, then @
@r

p
0
d

< 0. That is, a rate cut would
pivot the possibilities frontier outwards and the regulator would face a better trade-o¤ than
before. This is represented in gure 3.
Figure 3: impact of a rate cut when the prot e¤ect is relatively strong
d
p(x,d)
0
1
d 'd
( )dxp ,
( )',dxp
Intuitively, we could relate this to a post-crisis situation, where banks have to deleverage
because, among other reasons, they face funding constraints. Given the need to deleverage,
a rate cut does not spur levering incentives but does maintain banksprotability. Absent
that protability, banksincentives to gamble might rise, as arguably occurred in the wake of
the US Savings & Loan crisis or the Japanese crisis of the early 1990s (Peek and Rosengren,
2005). In this type of situation a rate cut improves nancial stability (at least temporarily)
and the regulator allows this to "pass through" by partly loosening his standards. A realistic
example would be regulatory forbearance on the rebuilding of capital bu¤ers after a crisis,
allowing banks a long period of time to acquire the needed equity.
Case 3: Knife-edge: there exists one specic case where regulation does not respond
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at all to monetary policy. This occurs for a very specic parameterization and gure 1 then
represents the regulators problem for any r. From equation (7) this occurs when the di¤erence
between @x
@r
and
@d
@r
 is exactly large enough so that:
@p (x; d)
@x
( )
@x
@d
(+)

@d
@r
+
@x
@r

(+)
=
@p (x; d)
@d
( )
@d
@r
;
( )
and therefore @
@r

p
0
d

= 0. This serves as a benchmark to illustrate that it is unlikely
that the regulators possibilities frontier is invariant to monetary policy or, equivalently, that
a regulator would hardly ever maintain the same level of nancial stability regardless of the
interest rate. In anything other than this knife-edge case nancial stability ends up responding
to monetary policy, in spite of the presence of a fully optimizing macroprudential regulator.
We summarize the results as follows:
Summary 4 The impact of the interest rate, r, on the regulators policy, d, depends on the
monetary transmission channels:
1. When the prot e¤ect, @x
@r
, is relatively weak as compared to the impact of the interest
rate on leverage,
@d
@r
, then @
@r
h
dp(x;d)
d(d)
i
> 0. A rate cut dr < 0 will then lead to a
regulatory tightening d
 
d

< 0, but not to the point that the same level of nancial
stability is maintained: dp < 0.
2. When instead @x
@r
is large enough compared to
@d
@r
, then @
@r
h
dp(x;d)
d(d)
i
< 0. Here, a rate
cut will lead to a regulatory loosening i.e.: d
 
d

> 0, which nonetheless maintains more
nancial stability than initially, i.e.: dp > 0.
3. In between, there exists a knife-edge case where @
@r
h
dp(x;d)
d(d)
i
= 0 and regulation maintains
the same level of stringency for any interest rate.
Overall, then, the regulator does not counterbalance the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy. This occurs in spite of the fact that the regulator decides on policy before the bank,
has full knowledge of the banks problem and has complete freedom to adjust his policy. The
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reason is that monetary policy a¤ects the whole optimization problem of the regulator, not just
bank risk. The regulators optimal policy thus does not keep the probability of bank default
constant. The analysis shows that monetary policy continues to a¤ect bank risk taking. In
an environment where both monetary and regulatory authorities are setting policy optimally
but independently of each other, an interest rate change constitures an externality that the
regulator will not neutralize.
6 Policy implications
The recent empirical literature has found conrming evidence that monetary policy a¤ects
nancial stability. In this paper we set up a model in which we demonstrate that there are
two channels through which a change in the interest rate a¤ects a banks behavior: through
prot and leverage. The question that then follows is whether the regulator is in the position
to neutralize these e¤ects and still achieve his objective of safeguarding nancial stability. We
show that monetary policy a¤ects the environment in which the regulator operates, (possibil-
ities frontier) and that by itself implies that even in an optimizing framework, the regulator
will not neutralize these two e¤ects.
The direction in which monetary policy pushes macroprudential regulation depends on the
state of the nancial cycle. In buoyant times when nancial intermediaries are inclined to take
on more leverage and their protability is secured, a rate cut is likely to spur on more risk
taking. Following our model, this will only be partly counteracted by a regulatory tightening
and the macroprudential authority would be allowing part of the negative impact of monetary
policy to nancial stability to "pass through". Instead, at times when banks are less inclined
to lever and their protability is impaired, such as in the aftermath of a nancial crisis, a rate
cut may actually translate into reduced risk taking incentives. The regulator will optimally
move in the same direction as the monetary authority, and loosen regulation when monetary
policy becomes more accommodative.
The question that follows this analysis, but which the paper does not address explicitly, is
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what the knowledge of these two transmission e¤ects imply for monetary policy itself. Should
monetary policy internalize the regulators problem and therefore, lean against nancial im-
balanceson the upside but lean with the windon the downturn of the nancial cycle? Or
does the issue merit full coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies?8 The paper
stops short of providing an answer to this, but the recent trend of central banks acquiring
macroprudential portfolios is a reection of its potential merits.
8For more on the joint conduct of monetary policy and bank regulation, see Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1995), Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999), Ioannidou (2005) and Agur and Sharma (2014).
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